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WHAT IS AN INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY




This article explores the two mainstream directions of debates about the possibility
of establishing  a kind  of international  cybersecurity  regime.  It  develops  the idea
of different  governance  models  based  on sovereignty,  on the one  hand,
and multistakeholderism  on the other.  The application  of international  relations
theory helps to understand the current process and stalemate initiatives regarding
state  cooperation  in this  field.  In addition,  the author  pays  attention
to the applicability  of the constructivism  framework  to the understanding
of cybersecurity  threats  and the elaboration  of international  norms  applicable
to cyberspace. Finally, the article concludes with the idea that the multistakeholder
approach  to norm-making  may  become  a viable  solution  to the problem
of constructing an international cybersecurity regime.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Security is a key concern for all states. In fact, many of today’s technologies
are  a direct  result  of research  and development  in national  defense
industries.  However,  at times  technological  advancements  in other  fields
impinge  on states’  security  concerns.  The revolution  in Information
and Communications  Technologies  (ICT)  presents  one  such  case.
With the emergence  of global  cyberspace  at the beginning  of the 21st
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century,  national  cybersecurity  has  raised  its  priority  in foreign
and domestic  policies  of states.  Since  there  is  no  international  regime
governing  cyberspace,  like  the regime  of high  seas  or outer  space,  states
have  been  increasingly  finding  themselves  in conflict  over  the breach
of cyberspace that they perceive as a threat to their national security. 
Cyberspace  has  gained  a great  importance  for human  interactions
as well  as for a higher  level  –  international  relations.  More  importantly,
the cyber domain is multi-faceted – the flow of information and actions runs
between  these  two  quite  separate  (in comparison  with other  domains)
levels. It may become necessary to regulate cyberspace as outer space, sea
and airspace  to establish  common  “rules  of game”  and to avoid  arbitrary
and potentially  harmful  actions  of states.  Bilateral  agreements  between
nations,  sometimes  called  as “cyberpacts”,  have  become  a widespread
practice  of strategic  defense  and cooperation.1 As we  are  witnessing
a dangerous  trend  of cyberspace  militarization,  some  experts  argue
that wars  of future  are  cyberwars.2 This  statement  falls  in the discourse
of war as
“not  merely  a political  act,  but also  a real  political  instrument,
a continuation  of political  commerce,  a carrying  out  of the same  by other
means.”3
A war  is  an act  of violence,  aimed  at making  the adversary  to compel
to someone’s will. Clauzewitz argued that war among nation states always
stemmed  from political  reasons.  Violence  used  for waging  wars  tended
to exploit new discoveries in science and technology to counteract adverse
violence. Connecting this idea to cyberspace seems to be logical,  however
1 See for example: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2011) United States and India Sign
Cybersecurity  Agreement. [press  release],  19  July.  Available  from:  https://www.hsdl.org/?
view&did=682137 [Accessed  25  March  2015];  Soglashenie  mezhdu  Pravitel'stvom Rossijskoj
Federacii i Pravitel'stvom Kitajskoj Narodnoj Respubliki o sotrudnichestve v oblasti obespechenija
mezhdunarodnoj informacionnoj bezopasnosti, 8 May 2015. Available from: http://government.
ru/media/files/5AMAccs7mSlXgbff1Ua785WwMWcABDJw.pdf  [Accessed  10  June  2015];
UK Government. (2015). UK-China Joint Statement on building a global comprehensive strategic
partnership for the 21st Century. [press release], 22 October. Available from: https://www.gov.
uk/government/news/uk-china-joint-statement-2015  [Accessed  25  March  2015];  White
House. (2015). President Obama and President X joint statement on cybersecurity. [press release],
25 September. Available from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact
-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states [Accessed 25 March 2015].
2 Clarke, R., Knake, R. (2010)  Cyber War: the Next Threat to National Security and What to Do
about It. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. 
3 Clausewitz,  C; Howard, M.,  Editor and translator;  Paret,  P.,  Editor and translator  (1989)
[1832]. On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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there  are  a plenty  of cyberskeptics  who  refuse  to name  future  wars
as cyberwars,  because  cyber  attacks  and computer  operations  may  have
only  indirect  potential  for being  physically  violent,  notwithstanding  that
they are kinds of classical hostile activities like espionage and sabotage.4
Militarization of cyberspace is a controversial and difficult for measuring
process.  The indirect  indicators  of militarization  are  instant  messages
from the media about an increase in expenses  and development of military
capabilities for cyberspace in different countries. Such capabilities include
cyber  offence  and defense  tools,  involvement  of IT  specialists
and programmers  in defense  strategies,  creation  of military  units
and commands  responsible  for cyberspace  operations.  In order  to prevent
the worst  scenario  and regulate  the still  unseen  cyber  arms  race,  there  is
a necessity  to put  much  attention  to the cyber  dimension  of international
security.
The lack  of a shared  definition  of what  cyberspace  and cybersecurity
across  the world  is  has  led  to a relatively  slow  negotiation  process
for the formation of an international cyberspace  regime. The central  theme
of the contemporary  debates  is  a future  configuration  of such
an international  regime.  All  parties  involved  in the issue  can  be  roughly
divided  into two  camps  –  adherents  of the multistakeholder  model
(with equal participation of states, business and society in cyber governance
issues)  and supporters  of the sovereignty-based  model  (with total
government  control  over  cyber  infrastructure  and information  flows
for security  needs).  This  article  focuses  on analysis  of ideas  expressed
by Russia,  China,  and the US  in connection  to possible  cyber  governance
models,  as these countries try to take  the lead and put forward initiatives
to the international  community  to promote  their  views  and advance  their
interests. One of the factors that hampers inter-state dialog is the difference
in interpretation  of cybersecurity.  On the one  hand,  it  is  about  security
of physical infrastructure – wired, fiber optic networks, routing equipment,
storage systems and database servers; on the other, it may also encompass
the security of information flows that circulate through this infrastructure.
The last  interpretation  has  direct  implications  for freedom  of expression
and access  to information.  These  assumptions  predominantly  define
4 See for example: Rid, T. (2013) Cyber War Will Not Take Place. New York: Oxford University
Press.; Gartzke, E. (2013) the Myth of Cyber War. Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down
to Earth. International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 41-73.
132 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 11:1
the features  that  underlie  the governance  models  for the cyber  domain
and the participation of various stakeholders in particular.
2. GOVERNANCE MODELS
Very often scholars draw analogies between the cyber domain and the old
domains of power such as the high seas, outer space or Antarctica because it
is  a “global  commons”.  The “commons”  refers  to resources  that  are  not
excludable  but rival  in consumption.  However,  the “technical”  status
of cyberspace that allowed for naming it “commons” is not a defining feature
for such a comparison. Instead, from a legal perspective, the most important
unifying feature of these domains is that they are not currently partitioned
and governed  according to traditional  Westphalian  sovereignty  –  in other
words, 
“states enshrined the non-sovereign status of old domains in international
treaties”.5
That is why we can single out some useful patterns for prospective global
governance of cyberspace. Nevertheless, the analogy between cyber and old
domains has  its  limits.  The governance  solutions were  similar for the old
domains  —  multilateral  governance,  governance  by treaty,  and certain
demilitarization. But the cyber domain has distinct presets to be considered
in the new governance model. These presets imply empowerment of private
parties,  governance  through  norms,  and regulated  militarization.
The physical  infrastructure  level  of cyberspace  is  located  within  national
borders  of states  and often  owned  by private  parties.6 This  fact  prevents
the usage of complete analogy between cyberspace and global commons.
According to Kristen Eichensehr,  cyberspace has gone through several
stages  of cyber  governance  and its  relations  with  sovereignty.7 Since
5 Eichensehr,  K. (2015)  The Cyber-Law of Nations.  Georgetown Law Journal,  317.  Available
from:  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447683 [Accessed  7  December
2016].
6 According  to Youchai  Benkler  (2000),  information  environment  is  composed  of three
layers - “the physical  infrastructure  layer,”  the “logical  infrastructure  layer,”  and “the  content
layer.” the physical layer includes infrastructure like cables, wires, and routers. The logical
layer consists of software. Above both is the content layer, which includes “the stuff that gets
said or written within any given system of communication”. For the purposes of this article we
consider cyberspace as a close concept to information environment.
7 Eichensehr,  K. (2015)  The Cyber-Law of Nations.  Georgetown Law Journal,  317.  Available
from:  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447683 [Accessed  7  December
2016].
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the 1990s,  cyber  itself  was  seen  as sovereign  –  users,  not  governments,
designed rules of the Internet because cyberspace 
“needs and can create its own law and legal institutions”.8
An example of such self-governance is the domain name system (DNS),
which  evolved  from  decisions  made  by engineers  and the  practices
of Internet  service  providers.  The second  stage  began  in the  early  2000s,
when  states  started  to realize  the potential  of the  Internet  as  well
as challenges it brought along. It has become clear that a new regulation is
needed  to facilitate  the use  of the  Internet  and prevent  crimes  related
to the abuse  of the  ICT.  In addition,  an idea  emerged  that  states  could
regulate  the Internet  by controlling  its  underlying  hardware  within  their
national  borders.  However,  two  issues  define  the feasibility  of control:
whether  such  a control  is  important  for a state  in order  to protect
its political stability; whether costs of imposing such a control are worthy.9
Finally, the 2010s are characterized by government-to-government debates
over cyber governance, the agenda being much more comprehensive than
transnational cybercrime issues. 
The  current  debate  among  states  turns  upon  a particular  model
for global cybersecurity. As mentioned in the introduction, the alternatives
are  sovereignty-based  and multistakeholder  models.  To develop this  idea
further  by applying  terms  from international  law  we  can  add  important
extensions  to both  models.  Thus,  cyberspace  can  be  treated,  on the  one
hand, as a sovereign territory, and as a global commons on the other. Each
extreme option implies a particular type of a legal regime. Also, even where
the concept  of territorial  sovereignty  cannot  be  applied  to the full  extent
(as is  the case  in cyberspace),  global  governance  is  still  possible
– an international  regime  for the high  seas  and outer  space  are
the examples. Another important question that is open for cyberspace but
resolved  in aforementioned  examples  is  the role  of private  parties
in governance (see Tab.1).10 
8 Johnson, D., Post, D. (1996) Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, Stanford Law
Review,  48,  Available  from:  https://cyber.harvard.edu/is02/readings/johnson-post.html
[Accessed 12 March 2015].
9 Goldsmith, J. (1998) The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies, 5, Issue 2. Available from: http://www.repository.law.indiana.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1130&context=ijgls [Accessed 15 March 2015].
10 The compilation is based on Eichensehr,  K. (2015) the Cyber-Law of Nations.  Georgetown
Law Journal, 317.
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Tab. 1: Visions of governance models
Any governance model is defined by two main factors – who participate
in decision-making  and who  has  an overall  control  over  taking
and implementing decisions. As it can be seen from the table above, the US,
Russia,  and China  support  different  solutions  for cyberspace.  Russia
and China endorse a multilateral model in which states interact with each
other and make decisions about policy and permissible actions in the cyber
domain.  The state-based  model  opens  the door  to a greater  regulation
of information.  This  is  the focus  of the  proposed  “Cyber  Code  of Conduct”
by members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.11 The United States
and its allies endorse a multistakeholder model where Internet governance
includes “all appropriate stakeholders”, such as a private sector, civil society,
academia,  and individuals,  in addition  to governments.12 The application
of the  multistakeholder  model  excludes the existence  of any  international
treaty  by definition.  However,  the need  to define  the “rules  of the  game”
requires elaboration of globally accepted norms. Finally, the “third option”
represents  pure  private  governance,  which  is  close  to the idea  of cyber
as sovereign  described  by J.  Barlow  in his  declaration  of independence
of cyberspace.13 This  idea  has  roots  in the  history  of Internet
commercialization  and its  deployment  in some  countries  without  close
11 United Nations General Assembly. (2011) Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent
Representatives  of China,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  the Russian  Federation,  Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan to the United Nations. A/66/359. New York. Available from: http://undocs.org/
A/66/359 [Accessed 15 March 2015]; United Nations General Assembly. (2015) Letter dated 9
January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian
Federation,  Tajikistan  and Uzbekistan  to the United  Nations.  A/69/723.  New  York.  Available
from:  https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf
[Accessed 15 March 2015].
12 The White  House.  (2011)  The U.S.  International  Strategy  for Cyberspace. Washington  D.C.
Available  from:  https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf [Accessed 15 March 2015].
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government  attention  at  initial  stages.  It  led  to the prevalence  of private
parties  or professional  IT  communities  in the  first  stage  of the  “rules-
creation”  process.  However,  the recent  increased  involvement
of governments  in regulation  and examples  of “Internet  takeovers”
in authoritarian states do not allow for speaking about the viability of this
governance option.
The  multistakeholder  approach  deserves  describing  in more  detail.
The very notion of multistakeholderism is new to the international relations
theory  and is  undergoing  theorization.  M.  Raymond  and L.  DeNardis
define multistakeholderism
“as two  or more  classes  of actors  engaged  in a  common  governance
enterprise  concerning  issues  they  regard  as public  in nature,
and characterized  by polyarchic  authority  relations  constituted
by procedural rules.”14
By polyarchy they understand distribution of authority among a number
of actors. Nevertheless, the distribution of authority is nominal in practice.
The typology  of stakeholder  participation  proposed  by W.  Drake  reveals
the level  of involvement  and,  respectively,  the distribution  of authority.
He distinguishes three types:15 
• weak participation of non-state actors in government-led initiatives,
limited ability to articulate their own position (as observers)
• limited  capacity  for participation  in comparison  with government
representatives (as consulting experts in working groups)
• non-state actors act as equal peers with governments in the drawing
up of the agenda, elaboration of rules, iterative consultations (“strong
multistakeholderism”)
Obviously, the last ideal type can hardly be found in practice,16 and there
are plenty of reasons for that.  Firstly, inadequate participation of non-state
13 Barlow,  J.  Electronic  Frontier  Foundation.  (1996)  A Declaration  of the  Independence
of Cyberspace. [record] 8 February, Davos. Available from: https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-
independence [Accessed 15 March 2015].
14 Raymond,  M.,  DeNardis,  L.  (2015)  Multistakeholderism:  anatomy  of an  inchoate  global
institution. International Theory,7, Issue 3 November, pp. 572-616. Available from: https://
doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000081 [Accessed 3 July 2016].
15 Drake,  W.  (2011)  Multistakeholderism:  Internal  Limitations  and External  Limits.
In: Wolfgang  Kleinwächter  (ed.)  Discussion  Paper  Series  No. 1,  MIND  #2  Internet  Policy
Making. Berlin-Nairobi: Internet and Society Collaboratory.
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stakeholders  is  sometimes  caused  by lack  of resources  to travel
and participate  on-site.  W.  Drake  emphasizes  the reluctance  of industrial
democracies  to invest  in multistakeholder  initiatives  in order  to facilitate
organizational  expenses  and travel  support,  together  with unwillingness
to provide political  support.  Also,  there  is  a gap in nominal  and effective
participation due to the character of the multistakeholder process, which is
very  complex  in terms  of procedures  and amounts  of information
and the number of issues that stakeholders are supposed to discuss. Despite
the idea  of comprehensive  inclusion  of all  concerned  parties,
multistakeholderism  is  not  cooperative  for newcomers  because
the workflow is dispersed among the communities, making it difficult to see
the connections  to the global  aim  of the  whole  process.  Ultimately,
C. Trautmann puts forward the idea of strengthening multistakeholderism
positions by connecting
“multistakeholder fora with traditional decision-making bodies:  the latter’s
task would be to implement the principles crafted in the former.”17
In this  connotation,  multistakeholderism  seems  to be  rather  a mode
of “decision-shaping” than alternative decision-making.
3. GOVERNANCE MODELS
Turning back to the main question of the article  –  what  is  a cybersecurity
regime?  –  we  should  explain  what  we  understand  under  this  notion.
Regimes  define  the range  of permissible  actions  by outlining  explicit
injunctions for actors.  The most  widely used definition of an international
regime formulated by S. Krasner signifies that international regimes are 
“implicit  or explicit  principles,  norms,  rules  and decision-making
procedures  around  which  actors'  expectations  converge  in a  given  area
of international relations.”18
16 The  IANA  transition  process  may  be  acknowledged  as illustration  of strong
multistakeholderism due to the ICANN policy of inclusion of governments, tech, business,
and civil society in shaping the future of Internet governance.
17 Trautmann,  C. (2011)  Multistakeholderism needs  fundamental  and decisive legitimation.
In: Wolfgang  Kleinwächter  (ed.)  Discussion  Paper  Series  No.  1,  MIND  #2  Internet  Policy
Making. Berlin-Nairobi: Internet and Society Collaboratory.
18 Krasner,  S.  (1982)  Structural  Causes and Regime Consequences:  Regimes  as Intervening
Variables. International Organization, 2, Issue 36, Spring, pp. 185-205.
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However, this definition is too broad; as J. Mearsheimer points out, such
a formulation of a concept covers 
“almost  every  regularized  pattern  of activity  between  states,  from  war
to tariff.”19
A more  restricted  definition  treats  regimes  as multilateral  agreements
among states, which aim to regulate national actions within an issue-area.20
Nevertheless, both definitions deserve our attention in equal terms. Current
controversy and uncertainty for the international regime for cyberspace lies
within a particular type of regime – norms, rules, and procedures that guide
actors’ behavior, or a more restricted multilateral treaty with fixed penalties
for disobedience.  Here  we  can  draw  parallels  with  governance  models
described  in the  previous  part.  The former  is  softer  and makes  sense
for the multistakeholder approach,  while the latter  resembles  sovereignty-
based governance.
Since  an international  regime  can  be  also  viewed  as a form
of cooperation  and coordination  between  actors,  it  is  worth  considering
how  the main  IR  paradigms  depict  coordination  and cooperation
in cyberspace.
Realists  considered  cooperation  problems  as  essential
to the international system because of their anarchic structure.21 The security
dilemma  is  one  of the examples  of the cooperation  problem.  A security
dilemma  means  a situation  where  efforts  of one  nation  to improve  its
security  decrease  the security  of others.  In response,  another  nation  tries
to enhance  its  own  defense  capabilities.  Such  consecutive  steps  result
in an arms  race,  worsening  of diplomatic  relations,  and even  in an open
conflict.  For cyberspace,  it  can  unfold  in the form  of a cyber  arms  race.
Countries try to build up their offensive cyber capabilities as, for example,
espionage  through  intrusion  to computer  networks  and dissemination
of malware for spying purposes.22 Another important  factor that  hampers
cooperation  is  a difficulty  in distinguishing  between  offensive
19 Mearsheimer, J. (1995) The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security,
19, Issue 3, Winter, pp. 5-49.
20 Haggard,  S.,  Simmons,  B.  (1987)  Theories  of international  regimes.  International
Organization, 41, Issue 3, pp. 491- 517.
21 Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley Pub. Co.
22 Craig,  A.,  Valeriano,  B.  (2016) Conceptualising Cyber Arms Races.  In:  N.  Pissanidis,  H.
Rõigas, M. Veenendaal (Eds.)  8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Tallinn: NATO
CCD COE Publications.
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and defensive weapons and policies of states. If we focus on “cybersecurity
dilemma”,  the definition  can  be  transferred  with particular  details.  In this
case, it means that efforts by one country to enhance the security of its cyber
infrastructure  decrease  the cybersecurity  of others.  Cybersecurity  can  be
achieved  either  through  the development  of offensive  or defensive  cyber
warfare  capabilities.  An important  addition is  that  cyber-attack  is  easier,
faster, and cheaper than cyber-defense, because 
“effective defense must be successful against all attacks, whereas an attacker
needs to succeed only once.”23
In  other  words,  factors  of time  for envision  of coming  attack  as  well
as physical buffer space to resist it (features of conventional kinetic warfare)
do  not  work  in cyberspace,  thus  making  offense  capabilities  a priority.
Moreover,  the “cybersecurity  dilemma”  is  also  complicated  by problems
of definition (what constitutes a cyber weapon) and attribution (the source
of an attack). 
Thus, cooperation between states on cybersecurity depends on whether
offensive  and defensive  cyber  warfare  weapons  and policies  can  be
distinguished one from another. Even if countries agreed on the definition
of cyber  weapon,  it  would  be  highly  difficult  to distinguish  between
offensive  and defensive  cyber  capabilities.  The majority of military unites,
in the USA and China in particular, responsible for cybersecurity, possesses
both  offensive  and defensive  capabilities.  Such  capabilities  may  include
technologies  of dual  use.  Solutions  for cooperation  proposed  by realists
include  a cyber  arms  control  in the form  of a treaty,  but  the definition
and attribution  problems  together  with the “verifiability  problem”
(compliance to the treaty) make it a difficult task. In other words, it is hard
to imagine  the emergence  of an  IAEA-like  (International  Atomic  Energy
Agency) organization for cyberspace as it was organized to control nuclear
energy use.
Liberal theories put an emphasis on cheating and dividing gains among
states  for cooperation  and coordination  problems.24 For example,
coordination problems in technocratic areas of global governance are solved
23 National  Research  Council,  Computer  Science  and Telecommunications  Board.  (1999)
Realizing the Potential of C4I: Fundamental Challenges. Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press.
24 Snidal,  D.  (1985)  The limits  of hegemonic  stability  theory.  International  Organization,  39,
Issue 4, pp. 579-614.
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through the creation of specialized international organizations. For instance
–  the International  Telegraph  Union  created  in 1865  and later
the International  Telecommunications Union (ITU)  for allocation of global
radio  spectrum  and satellite  orbits,  development  of technical  standards
for interconnectedness  and setting  International  Telecommunication
Regulations  (ITRs).  The revision  of ITRs  in 2012  turned  a coordination
problem into a cooperation one because a part of the member states refused
to sign  the new ITRs,  considering that  they  imposed more  governmental
control over the Internet.25 Some countries (Russia, China) advocate giving
the ITU  responsibilities  to define  policy  for Internet  governance  that  is
currently  distributed  among  different  entities  of private  and non-
commercial  background.26 Governance  of distribution  of Internet  names
and numbers  together  with the development  of technical  protocols can be
firmly  classified  as an issue  of low  politics  and involve  coordination
problems. But in recent years it was highly politicized and brought together
with  security  concerns  that  the agreement  on a particular  equilibrium
of governance model presents difficult negotiation problems.27
Liberalist  thinkers  argued  that  international  institutions  (including
international rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures) can
help  to facilitate  cooperation  even  in the  face  of a  security  dilemma.28
International  norms  can  play  roles  in both  constraining  state  behavior
and encouraging  interstate  cooperation.  In the context  of the IR  theory,
norms refer to
“collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors”.29 
25 International Telecommunications Union. (2012) WCIT-12 Final Acts. Dubai. Available from:
www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/documents/final-acts-wcit-12.pdf [Accessed 19 April 2015].
26 Kurbaljia, J. (2014) Introduction to Internet governance. 6th ed. Malta: DiploFoundation.
27 ICANN  is  undergoing  the process  of its  reorganizations  towards  more  accountability
and independence.  Transition  of the  US  National  Telecommunications  and Information
Administration (NTIA) oversight role over IANA came to an end. It started in March 2014,
and two years later a final proposal (elaborated upon with participation of all stakeholders)
was introduced to the NTIA for consideration.  The summer of 2016 was named the “end
of the era of American control over the Internet”.
28 See for example:  Keohane,  R.  (1984)  After  Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord  in the  World
Political  Economy.  Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press;  Krasner,  S.  (1983)  International
Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Axelrod, R. Keohane, R. (1986) Cooperation Under
Anarchy.  Princeton:  Princeton University  Press;  Martin,  L.,  Simmons,  B.  (1998)  Theories
and Empirical  Studies of International  Institutions.  International  Organization,  52,  Issue  4,
Autumn, pp. 729-757.
29 Legro,  J.  (1997)  Which  Norms  Matter?  Revisiting  the ‘Failure’  of Internationalism.
International Organization, 51, Issue 1.
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Although  norms  are  not  always  codified  in law,  they  often  inspire
or lead to the development of international law. Institutions can help create
and foster  norms,  although norms can  also  develop at the domestic  level
and then  “diffuse”  throughout  the international  system.30 As institutions
serve  as instruments  through which states  can  achieve  cooperation,  they
may  impose  constraints  on a  state  behavior.  But  these  constraints  are
usually accepted as the inevitable costs of cooperation.
Thus  “cybersecurity  dilemma”  may  potentially  be  resolved  through
the creation  of international  institutions.  Moreover,  liberalism
acknowledges  non-state  entities  as actors,  so a possible  international
organization  for maintenance  of cybersecurity  can  be  composed  of states
and non-state  actors  (represented  by the IT  industry,  for example).  Such
option  would  enable  participants  to strengthen  trust  by revealing
capabilities  and methods  to identify  cyber  war  incidents  and share
defensive technologies. The IT industry can greatly contribute its expertise
to foster  trust  and transparency.  On the other  hand,  participation  in such
an organization  will  require  members  to share  sensitive  information
about their cyber  capabilities,  which they are not willing to do,  fearing it
could  weaken  their  relative  positions.  Simultaneously,  cyber  powers
(like the US,  for instance)  would  hardly  be  ready  to join  such
an organization in an attempt to avoid any accountability for their offensive
cyber capabilities and to keep their relative dominance in the cyber domain.
The  constructivist  approach  pays  attention  to the perception  of reality
that  defines  the reason for cooperation  between  states  on security  issues.
Although  many  constructivists  do  not  contest  the idea  that  there  is
a material  basis  to security  threats,  they argue that  the labeling of diverse
activities  as threats  to national  security  is  a product  of “intersubjective
interpretation”.31 Hence,  discursive  practices  of cyber  threats  formulation
and perception play an important role. 
Cybersecurity  discourse  is  about  more  than  one threat  form,  ranging
from  computer  viruses  and other  malicious  software  to the cyber-crime
activity and the categories of cyber-terror and cyber-war. Each sub-issue is
30 Finnemore,  M.,  Sikkink,  K.  (1998)  International  Norm  Dynamics  and Political  Change.
International Organization, 52, Issue 4.
31 See  for example:  Dartnell,  M.  (2003)  Weapons  of Mass  Instruction:  Web  Activism
and the Transformation of Global Security. Millennium, 32, Issue 3, pp. 477-499; Hansen, L.,
Nissenbaum,  H.  (2009)  Digital  Disaster,  Cyber  Security,  and the Copenhagen  School.
International Studies Quarterly, 53, Issue 4, pp. 1155-1575.
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represented and treated differently in the political  process  and at different
points  in time.32 That  is  why  the theory  of securitization  introduced
by Buzan,  Weaver  and De Wilde  can be  useful  to draw the link between
a national security and cyber domain.33 
“The question of when a threat becomes a national security threat depends
on what type of threat it is, how the recipient perceives it.”34
Securitization is a process of justifying a new security policy in several
steps.  Firstly,  an actor (it  can be  a government or secondary actors)  starts
to voice  serious concerns over a topic and formulates  threats  to a referent
object  (a nation,  a state)  that  has  to be  protected.  The second  step  is
audience  validation  of a formulated  threat  as an existential  threat.  When
the necessity  is  acknowledged,  an actor  starts  to design  required  policies
and actions  needed  to be  taken  to ensure  security  of the referent  object.
For constructivist  studies,  the scale  of analysis  matters  a lot  –  actors
and referent  objects  comprise  a unique set  of threats.  Thus,  securitization
theory can help to trace back states’  intentions by analyzing the language
of the cybersecurity  discourse.  Moreover,  the very word “cybersecurity” is
replaced  sometimes  (or even  disappears  from  the public  discourse)
by information  security.  Consequently,  threat  representations  differ
in a substantial  way.  Information  security  implies  more  sensitive  issues
for national  security  –  threats  acquire  a psychological  and ideological
context  –  for instance,  dissemination  of harmful  information  that  can
destroy political stability and public order. The cyber/information security
discourse differs a lot in Russia, China, and the US.35
The analysis of threat perceptions in Russia,  China,  and the US reveals
common  grounds  in cyber  threat  perceptions  for further  cooperation
32 Dunn Cavelty,  M.  (2013)  From Cyber-Bombs to Political  Fallout:  Threat  Representations
with an Impact  in the Cyber-Security  Discourse.  International  Studies  Review, 15,  Issue  1,
March. 
33 Buzan,  B.,  Waever,  O.  and De  Wilde,  J.  (1998).  Security:  a New  Framework  for Analysis.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
34 Buzan,  B.  (1991).  Peoples,  States  and Fear:  an Agenda  for International  Security Studies  in the
Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
35 The Russian Government. (2016) Doktrina Informacionnoi Bezoasnosti. 5 December, Moscow.
Available from: http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41460. [Accessed 10 February 2017]; the White
House. (2011) the U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace. Washington D.C. Available from:
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_
for_cyberspace.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2017]; Chang, A. (2014)  Warring State: China’s
Cybersecurity Strategy. [online] 3 December, Center for a New American Security. Available
from:  https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/warring-state-chinas-cybersecurity-
strategy [Accessed 10 February 2017].
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to mitigate the negative effect for a national security (see Tab.2).36 Colored
boxes indicate what threat or contentious issue is under the country’s focus.
The last  row  of the table  emphasizes  possible  policy  areas  for global
cooperation for the norm-making process.
Tab. 2: Common grounds for cooperation in combating cyber threats
Russia  and China  are  closer  to each  other  in threat  perceptions.  More
importantly,  they  put  an emphasis  on sovereignty  in cyberspace,  while
the US is  concerned with network  security  and a free  flow of information
for economic and political reasons. However, there are issues that all three
countries  acknowledge  as dangerous  for a national  security  –  ICT  use
for terrorist  purposes,  cybercrime,  threats  to safe  and stable  functioning
of the global  and national  critical  information  infrastructures,
and cyberattacks  on the national  critical  infrastructure  and industrial
control  systems.  As cyberspace  and the Internet  are  a transnational
and single  world  domain  (at least  so  far,  keeping in mind  the tendencies
for Internet  fragmentation),  there  is  a need  to elaborate  global  norms
of behavior (applicable for non-state actors also) with national enforcement.
The first  steps  are  already  taken  for outlined  issues:  confidence-building
36 Based on content analysis of national strategic documents. The complete list is introduced
in references in the end of the article. 
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measures in cyberspace;37 the Budapest convention to combat cybercrime;38
Internet  governance  evolution;  and the reform  of ICANN.  Yet,  all
stakeholders are still at odds with these issues.
4. CONSTRUCTIVISM FOR NORM-MAKING
In addition,  the constructivist  approach  also  can  shed  light  on the norm-
creation process. Constructivists have done a great deal of work attempting
to explain  the emergence  of new  international  norms.  The theory
of strategic social  construction proposed by M. Finnemore and K.  Sikkink
can  help  to answer  the question  of how  the cybersecurity  regime  can  be
achieved.39 Their proposed “life cycle” of norms consists of norm emergence,
norm cascade,  and internalization.  Firstly,  a norm emerges  from the need
for desirable  behavior  of stakeholders,  but  it  never  “enters  a normative
vacuum” and has to compete with other interests. Importantly, international
organizations serve as a platform through which norms can be promoted,
due  to their  expertise.  We  will  develop  the example  of such  norms’
promotion  for cyberspace  later  in this  paragraph.  Moreover,
institutionalization  of specific  rules  and principles  through  such
organizations  helps to clarify what  constitutes  the norm and its violation.
Further steps involve consecutive adoption of newly created norm by states,
in other  words,  “norm cascade”.  Finnemore  and Sikkink argue  it  happens
because states  want  to maintain  their  identity  of an international
community  member,  thus  showing  conformity.  Ultimately,  “automatic
conformance with the norm” is internalization – an extreme form of the norm
cascade. 
At the same  time,  a normative  change  may  become  the result
of procedural  changes  that  lead  to the creation  of new  policies.  Social
practices and background knowledge are central notions for understanding.
E. Adler and V. Pouliot define practices as
37 OSCE. (2016). Permanent Council Decision No. 1202. OSCE confidence-building measures
to reduce  the risks  of conflict  stemming  from the use  of information  and communication
technologies.  Vienna.  Available  from:  http://www.osce.org/pc/227281  [Accessed  10
February 2017].
38 Signed  by 50  countries.  The United  States  signed  and ratified  this  Convention  in 2007.
China did not sign the document, nor did Russia because of the problem “article 32(b)”.
This article  32  (b)  of the Convention  allows  the obtaining,  without  the consent
of the participating  countries,  access  to the computer  data  stored  on its  territory,
i.e., to conduct  cross-border  investigations  and investigative  activities.  Russia  considers
such a provision a violation of sovereign rights of states.
39 Finnemore,  M.,  Sikkink,  K.  (1998)  International  Norm  Dynamics  and Political  Change.
International Organization, 52, Issue 4.
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“socially  meaningful  patterns  of action  which,  in being  performed  more
or less  competently,  simultaneously  embody,  act  out  and possibly  reify
background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world.”40
This background knowledge is, in fact,  procedural rules that condition
the emergence  of norms  for social  practices.  If we  narrow  them
to diplomatic  practices,  we  will  get  written  and unwritten  rules  that
constitute the specific game of multilateral diplomacy as procedural rules.41
for states engaged in the negotiation process, it is highly important to have
the ability to use such procedural rules in their favor.
Another  point  for procedural  rules  focuses  on their  ability  to facilitate
negotiations  on a sensitive  issue.  In our  case,  the agreement  on norms
of responsible  state  behavior  for the use  of ICTs  presents  a highly
contentious  cooperation  problem.  However,  the UN  Group
of governmental  experts  on information  security  (UN  GGE)42 was  able
to achieve  tangible  results  by the third  round  of negotiations  because
the participating states did not object to procedural rules of presenting their
positions and assessing those of their counterparts. Thus, Russia and the US
came  to an agreement  that  International  Law  can  be  applied  to the use
of ICTs (it is worth noting that neither cyberspace nor information space is
used  in GGE  reports  for the satisfaction  of the countries’  positions).
The Table  below  illustrates  the results  of the  GGE  work  done  by 20
countries  on compiling the list  of existing  and emerging threats  in the use
of ICT.43 It also illustrates the progress in alignment of countries’  positions
on the issue. 
40 Adler, E., Pouliot, V. (2011). International practices. International. Theory, 3, p. 136
41 Adler-Nissen,  R.,  Pouliot,  V.  (2014)  Power  in practice:  Negotiating  the international
intervention in Libya. European Journal of International Relations, 20, Issue 4.
42 United  Nations  Group  of Governmental  Experts  on Developments  in the  Field
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UNODA.
Russia, China, and the US were country-members for each GGE convocation.
43 Table  is  based  on:  United  Nations  General  Assembly.  (2015).  Report  of the  Group
of Governmental  Experts  on Developments  in the  Field  of Information  and Telecommunications
in the  Context  of International  Security  A/70/174.  New  York.  Available  from:
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/228/35/PDF/N1522835.pdf?
OpenElement [Accessed 6 April 2016].
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Tab. 3: Finding common grounds within the UN GGE
Nevertheless,  the GGE  recommendations  for norms,  rules,
and confidence  building  measures  are  still  non-binding  and serve  rather
as guidelines  for voluntary  observance  than  institutionalized  norms
with clear  consequences  for incompliance.  One  of the problems  to turn
these recommendations into legally binding rules is the complicated nature
of cyberspace  and a wide  circle  of stakeholders  that  includes  not  only
governments but private actors as well. States are trying to solve a puzzle:
even  if  they  follow  strategic  social  construction  with procedural  norms
of UN  General  Assembly  First  Committee,  what  will  the international
regime  for cyberspace  look  like?  One  way  that  is  advocated  by the US
and its  allies  is  to apply  the existing  international  norms  to cyberspace
– those  written  in the UN  Charter,  the law  of armed  conflict  and law
of responsible  state  behavior.  Partly,  the GGE  resulted  in acknowledging
such  a way.  On the other  hand,  cyber/information  space  may  require
a special  multilateral  treaty.  The main  challenge  for this  option  is
the definition  of the space  under  consideration,  whether  it  is  global
commons  or a sovereign  territory.  Uncertainty  in this  issue  blocks
any further state cooperation.
K.  Erskine  and M.  Carr  define  main  challenges  for developing  norms
for cyberspace.44 First, they are new practices displaying the characteristics
of cyber-governance  of the global  domain  system,  coordination
of individual  networks,  social  media usage,  protection from cyberattacks,
44 Erskine,  K.,  Carr,  M.  (2016)  Beyond  ‘Quasi-Norms’:  the Challenges  and Potential
of Engaging with Norms  in Cyberspace.  In:  Anna-Maria  Osula  and Henry  Roigas  (Eds.)
International  Cyber Norms:  Legal,  Policy & Industry Perspectives.  Tallinn: NATO CCD COE
Publications.
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and the like. There is still no clear understanding of what behavior is wrong
or right  that  would  be  accepted  by all  stakeholders.  Another  factor  is
competing  value  systems  of stakeholders  –  understanding  of the privacy/
transparency/anonymity  balance  that  defines  the perception  of security
in cyberspace. As can be seen from Tab. 2,  even the three countries differ
in their  preferences.  In addition,  a variety  of stakeholders  also  contribute
to the values competition. For example, private sector aims at maximizing
its profits rather than at  concerning with national security issues. Finally,
the problem of attribution allows actors to deny any allegations for harmful
activities in cyberspace.
In the end,  Erskine  and Carr  stress  the idea  of quasi-norms
for cyberspace. Stakeholders 
“will  seek  to impose  rules  and codes  of conduct  on practices  that  further
their interests or values”;
but
“imposed rules are not norms, they are normative aspirations”,
because  norms  should  first  of all  be  internalized  by stakeholders,  since
norms inform the behavior through the prescriptive and evaluative nature.45
In this  respect,  the normative  aspiration  of the  US  to import  norms
from the law of armed conflict to cyberspace may seem useless, as imported
norms  from another  domain  “risk  to significantly  lose  meaning  and moral
force”. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The international  cybersecurity  regime  is  at the initial  stages
of its construction,  a norm-creation  stage.  However,  the contours  of this
regime  are  still  vague.  There  are  two  possible  scenarios  for further
development  –  adjustment  of the existing  international  law to cyberspace
peculiarities  (which  is  likely  to be  a stalemate),  or elaboration  of special
governance mechanisms. The special governance mechanisms remain mired
in uncertainty,  raising  questions  if cybersecurity  is  subject  to top-down
multilateral  regulation,  or more  non-state  stakeholders  should have  their
say, including the IT industry.
45 Ibid.
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The multilateral  approach  for cybersecurity  would  hardly  define
the new  regime.  The reasons  for such  argument  are  strong:  there  is  still
no common  agreement  on the  substance  of a treaty  or a convention
on international  cybersecurity.  Cyberspace  and information  space  differ
substantially  in their  underlying  meaning.  The content  analysis
of the countries’ perceived cyber/information threats revealed the fault line
between  the values  promoted  by the US,  on the one  hand,  and Russia
and China on the other.  While the US is concerned with secure  computer
networks simultaneously providing the open, secure Internet with free flow
of information and freedom of expression, it also builds up offensive cyber
capabilities to protect the current status quo. Russia and China place high
priority  on information  security  and combating  against  threats  that  may
harm society,  the political  regime,  and the stability of a state.  Such threats
also  include  terrorism,  extremism,  and separatism;  moreover,  Russia
emphasizes  information  expansion  of the foreign  media  in the country
and distortion of the domestic and international news picture. 
Cybersecurity  is  a very  complex  multi-component  issue  for a single
international  regime.  Despite  divergence  in threat  perceptions,  the three
countries  have  common  concerns:  ICT  use  for terrorist  purposes,
cybercrime,  stability  and resiliency  of the Internet  critical  infrastructure,
network  security,  and militarization  of cyberspace.  The UN  GGE  work
made  a significant  contribution  to the consensus  between  member-states
and even  broadened  the understanding  of common  challenges.  But
the group  still  has  a long  way  to go  for achieving  tangible  results.
If to separately regulate each area, agreed to be a high priority for countries,
multilateral  approach  will  still  be  weak  despite  the assumption  that
the established  procedural  rules  for norm-formulation  make  this  process
easier.  That  was  proven  by the example  of the impossibility  of the arms
control treaty for cyberspace:  there is still  no globally accepted definition
of what  a cyber  weapon  is.  In addition,  technologies  of dual-use  are
predominant in the IT area. Though states have already agreed on a number
of international  treaties  for arms-control  and non-proliferation,  the pool
of procedural  rules  and behavior  patterns  is  widely used;  the cyber  arms
control  treaty  is  hard  to design  because  of the  difficulties  in controlling
compliance.
Confidence building measures (CBMs) to protect  critical  infrastructure
could  be  taken  through  a multilateral  approach  –  and there  are  already
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examples  of bilateral  agreements,  and even  UN  GGE  recommendations
contain  a substantial  list  of particular  steps  for CBMs.  In reality,
the majority of cases show that CBMs exist only on paper. And here we can
see  a security  dilemma  –  if one  state  exhibits  more  vulnerabilities  than
another,  then the second  state  would  probably  use  this  information
with malicious intentions. 
The multilateral approach also has another considerable drawback – it
neglects  non-state  actors  in the process  of norm-making.  The case
of cyberspace  is  unique  in the sense  that  the IT  industry  exerts  a great
influence  on the cyber  policy  both  in creating  security  solutions
and in constructing  new  cyber  threats  as collateral  consequences  of their
business.
One  of the areas  for ensuring  stability  and resiliency  of the Internet
critical  infrastructure  is  the Internet  governance.  It  was  multistakeholder
from  the very  beginning.  States  entered  “the game”  after  the distributed
system of allocation and governance of Internet critical resources had been
invented.  Any  attempts  by states  (Russian  and China  in particular)
to establish control or intrude into the governance system are firmly pushed
back. Undoubtedly, states will have a say in the Internet governance policy,
but formulas for respective roles are still to be found.
Multistakeholderism should not be taken as a good solution to problems
caused  by cyberspace  features.  It  has  a lot  of limitations,  where
the distribution  of authority  between  stakeholders  is  the most  strong.
One of the  problems  for a multistakeholder  approach  to cybersecurity  is
to ensure  a win-win  public-private  partnership.  Firstly,  the IT  industry is
willing to participate in security projects for national critical infrastructure
when economic  benefits  overcome costs.  Secondly,  the absence  of shared
principles of cyber or information security that define the privacy/security
equilibrium  considerably  hampers  collaboration.  Even  in democratic
countries, the IT industry suffers from the effects of the government policy
aimed  at protecting  national  interests  and security  to the detriment
of protecting  various  human  rights,  such  as privacy  and free  flow
of information.  At least,  multistakeholderism  may  hopefully  produce
principles  that  would  constitute  the basis  for cybersecurity  norms  to be
accepted by all stakeholders. 
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